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Abstract. I present a discussion of some open issues in the philosophy of space-time theories.
Emphasis is put on the ontological nature of space and time, the relation between determinism and
predictability, the origin of irreversible processes in an expanding Universe, and the compatibility of
relativity and quantum mechanics. In particular, I argue for a Parmenidean view of time and change,
I make clear the difference between ontological determinism and predictability, propose that the
origin of the asymmetry observed in physical processes is related to the existence of cosmological
horizons, and present a non-local concept of causality that can accommodate both special relativity
and quantum entanglement.
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INTRODUCTION
Why physicists should care about philosophy?
Many physicists do not have a high opinion of the philosopher’s work or about what
philosophy can contribute to clarify the foundations of physical theories. This attitude is
probably the result of some loose ways of doing philosophy since the 19th century.
This discomfort towards some philosophical speculations was even shared by some
philosophers. Let us see, for instance, what Schopenhauer has to say about Hegel:
Hegel was commonplace, inane, loathsome, repulsive and an ignorant
charlatan, who with unparalleled effrontery compiled a system of crazy non-
sense that was trumpeted abroad as immortal wisdom by his mercenary fol-
lowers...
If philosophers have such thoughts about each other, why should we mind what they
say about physics? Actually, the distinction between physics and philosophy is rather
recent. Until the 19th century ‘natural philosophy’ was the usual term to describe the
research and study of nature. Science was initiated in Ancient Greece by people such as
Thales, Anaximander, and other pre-Socratic thinkers who speculated about the nature
of the physical world and were ready to criticize and argue rationally about their conjec-
tures. The founders of modern science, like Nicolas Oresme, Galileo Galilei, and Isaac
Newton were prone to philosophical and theological speculations. They were also wor-
ried about the very foundations of the theories they proposed and their interpretations.
Many thinkers of the 17th century, including Descartes, Pascal, Huygens, and Leibniz
can be considered either as scientists or philosophers, attending different aspects of their
investigations and concerns. Even in the 18th century, Kant, who was probably the most
influential philosopher of his time, was well-learned in physical science and made some
contributions to it.
It is only with the advent of professional philosophy that a divergence started, in the
early 19th century. Some philosophers, influenced by the Romantic movement, culti-
vated a disdain for science and the clear expression of thought. Approximately at the
same time, however, a revolution in mathematics lead by Gauss, Riemann, Weierstrass,
and others motivated many mathematicians to become interested in in philosophical
problems following a tradition that can be traced to Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Zeno
of Elea. William K. Clifford, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich L. Gottlob Frege, Charles S.
Peirce, and many others are clear examples of the quest for clarity of expression and
rational thinking in the 19th century. All this movement led to the birth of mathemat-
ical logic and formal languages especially suited for the philosophical discussion of
modern science; a formidable task that was systematically pursued in the 20th century
by thinkers such as Bertrand Russell, David Hilbert, Henri Poincaré, Hermann Weyl,
Moritz Schlick, Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and many others.
Logical empiricism gave rise to an unprecedented standard of precision and formal-
ization in the philosophical consideration of scientific achievements and theories. Under
the general expression of ‘analytic philosophy’, a scientifically informed way of research
in philosophy spread especially in the English-speaking world after the Second World
War. Currently, the logical and semantic tools at the disposal of analytical philosophers
seem indispensable in solving the interpretation problems of several theories of contem-
porary physics.
Some scientists soon undertook this, and many of the greatest physicists of the 20th
century made active research on philosophical and interpretation topics of quantum me-
chanics and general relativity. Among them we can highlight Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg,
Schrödinger, Hoyle, and Penrose; all of them wrote extensively on different philosophi-
cal problems.
All physical theories assume some ontology (i.e. some entities that are considered as
existent in the actual world), and some formal structure that requires proper interpreta-
tion. So, consciously or not, all physicists make philosophical commitments when doing
scientific research. It is better if these assumptions are explicit and consistent. This al-
lows a better understanding of the inner structure of scientific theories and facilitates
their confrontation with facts. A clear and consistent interpretation, in addition, is fun-
damental to prompt new developments. Contrarily, inconsistent or ad-hoc interpretations
can hinder the progress of science (see Ref. [1] for a full discussion).
Perhaps there are no more basic concepts in physics than those of space and time.
All physical theories presuppose them, even the so-called ‘space-time’ theories, like
General Relativity. Space-time theories deal with the structure and representation of
space and time, but say nothing about their nature. Are space and time physical entities,
like electrons or stars? Are they mere forms of our perception of such objects, as Kant
thought? Do they exist at all? If they exist, what are they made of? These are the kind of
questions that we will discuss first in our brief survey of philosophical topics of modern
physics.
THE NATURE OF SPACE AND TIME
A brief history of the problem
Concern for the nature of space and time can be traced to Ancient Greece. Natural
philosophers in the 5th century BC were worried about the origin of change. For Hera-
clitus of Ephesus, change was a basic feature of nature: everything was ‘in flux’. Even
things that apparently are immutable, at a basic level, according to Heraclitus, are un-
dergoing change. Parmenides of Elea famously denied the mere possibility of change.
He pointed out that ‘what is, is’ and ‘what is not, is not’. ‘Nothing’ is not a thing. It is
just the denial of the existence of things and, then, it cannot be an existent itself. Hence,
void, or empty space, cannot exist. Without empty space, for Parmenides, motion was
impossible. He understood motion as the successive occupation of empty places. If ev-
erything is filled, there is nowhere to move on. Reality must be a single, homogeneous,
unchanging unity. If we think that there is change, it is just because we do not have a true
perception of reality. Plato was deeply influenced by Parmenides, and postulated a world
of unchanging ideas, and a world of shadows where the physical, changing objects, were
just a mere reflection of the true world. Change, for Plato, is a form of corruption. Time,
the mobile form of eternity. Ontologically, for Plato, eternity is prior to time [2].
The challenge of Parmenides was taken at face value by Democritus and Leucippus
of Abdera. They accepted Parmenides’s idea that there cannot be change if there is no
void, and they inverted the reasoning: since there is change, then there must be a void.
Democritus and Leucippus, therefore, postulated two kind of existents: atoms and the
void. Atoms are indivisible and do not change. Void separates atoms so they can move
and combine to form the things that populate the Universe. Actually, since there are an
infinite number of atoms, there should be an infinite number of worlds. Ours is just one
among them. Change, then, is an emerging property of complex things. Time, a measure
of change. Interestingly, time results as an emergent property as well. If there were no
changing things, there would be no time.
Aristotle, in the 4th century BC, adopted a different theory of change, but kept the
same conclusion: time is the measure of change; space, the measure of extension.
Nothing would exist without changing things. For Aristotle, however, there are no atoms,
but substances and forms. Any object is some substance (the ‘stuff’ that makes it) with
some form. Substance remains, but form can change.
The logical treaties of Aristotle were preserved along the early Middle Ages, but the
physical and metaphysical treaties were recovered only in the High Middle Ages (12th-
13th centuries). Platonic views, which were dominant so far, slowly retreated in front
of the natural philosophy of Aristotle and his commentators. Different aspects of his
physics were developed and criticized by scholars like John Buridam, Nicolas Oresme,
William of Ockham, and Roger Bacon [3]. By the early 17th century, after the work of
Kepler, Copernicus, and Galileo, the Western natural philosophy was on the verge of a
major revolution.
This revolution, introduced by Isaac Newton, would be the culmination of a process
of understanding the world initiated in the Middle Ages with the revision of Aristotelian
views. It was a rediscovery of the theoretical, hypothetical-deductive methods used
by Parmenides, now powered by new mathematical tools. It was already clear for
Oresme and other scholars that kinematic and dynamics were quite different aspects
of change. Newton was able to develop a quantitative theory of dynamics and a theory
of gravitation. He could introduce constraints to the motion of physical objects with
differential equations for the functions that represent the position of the bodies. Time
appears as a free parameter in these equations. In his Philosopiae Naturalis Priincipia
Mathematica he famously wrote:
Absolute, true, and mathematical time, from its own nature, passes equably
without relation to anything external, and thus without reference to any change
or way of measuring of time.
Absolute, true, and mathematical space remains similar and immovable
without relation to anything external.
The place of a body is the space which it occupies, and may be absolute or
relative according to whether the space is absolute or relative.
Absolute motion is the translation of a body from one absolute place to
another; relative motion the translation from one relative place to another.
It is evident from these characterizations that, according to Newton:
• Space is something distinct from a body and exists independently of the existence
of bodies.
• Time is a kind fluid, that exists independently of any body.
• The true motion of a body does not consist of, or cannot be defined in terms of, its
motion relative to other bodies.
Actually, absolute motion for Newton is motion relative to absolute space . The
origin of his ideas was perhaps in a work by William Charleton which appeared in
1654 and was entitled Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana: Or a Fabrick of
Science Natural, upon the Hypothesis of Atoms, “Founded by Epicurus, Repaired by
Petrus Gassendus, Augmented by Walter Charleton". In that work, Charleton revisited
the Greek atomic doctrine and stated that time and space are real entities even though
they fit neither of the traditional categories of substance nor accident (i.e., property of
a substance). Additionally, he claimed that time “flow[s] on eternally in the same calm
and equal tenor," while the motion of all bodies is subject to "acceleration, retardation,
or suspension".
The postulation of two entities, space and time, without any obvious measurable prop-
erties, was suspicious for several thinkers. Gottfried W. Leibniz, in his correspondence
with the British thinker Samuel Clarke [4], defended a relationalist view of space and
time and attacked the absolute conceptions of Clarke and Newton. Leibniz was a ma-
jor continental rationalist. He used logic rather than empirical data to attack Newton’s
views on space and time. His arguments were based in two principles, that he considered
self-evident: the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and the Principle of the Identity
of Indiscernibles (PII). In his own words:
• PSR: “there ought to be some sufficient reason why things should be so, and not
otherwise”.
• PII: “to suppose two things indiscernible, is to suppose the same thing under two
names”.
From these principles, he developed the following argument against absolute space.
Let us consider two universes with exactly the same things in them located in the
exact same spatial relations, but, imagine, that these two set of things are located,
altogether, in different absolute locations in the two universes. Now, the two universes
are indiscernible. So, according to PII they should be the same. But they are not because
we are assuming an absolute space. The two universes also contradict the PSR, since
why should one of the universes exist instead of the other? These contradictions are
solved just dropping the concept of an absolute space.
Instead of absolute space and time, the notions which he considered unintelligible,
Leibniz proposed relational concepts: “I hold space to be something merely relative, as
time is, that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions”.
Space, is then understood as a set of relations among things. Actually, there is no space
in itself, there are just spatial relations among things. Empty space is an impossible
thing, a contradiction. For this reason, for Leibniz, the Universe is a plenum, as it was
for Parmenides. However, Leibniz not only accepts change. For him, change is essential.
Time is just a name for relative change. If there were no changing things, there would
be no time.
Newton argued for absolute space and motion through a thought experiment. Imagine
a rotating bucket filled with water. After a span communicating the motion of the bucket,
the water is again at rest with respect to it, but now its surface is concave. In this way,
absolute circular motion (acceleration) can be detected. Leibniz died in 1716, without
providing a satisfactory response to this remark by Newton, but with the conviction that
“the immediate cause of the change is in the body itself”.
In the 19th century Ernst Mach also had the opinion that absolute motion makes non-
sense. In 1893 he wrote [5]:
Newton’s experiment with the rotating water bucket teaches us only that
the rotation of water relative to the bucket walls does not stir any noticeable
centrifugal forces; these are prompted, however, by its rotation relative to the
mass of the Earth and the other celestial bodies. Nobody can say how the
experiment would turn out, both quantitatively and qualitatively, if the bucket
walls became increasingly thicker and more massive and eventually several
miles thick.
For Mach, the influence of the ‘distant stars’, i.e. the rest of the mass in the Universe,
is responsible for the curvature of the water’s surface. Were the entire Universe rotating
around the bucket, the effect would be the same. All motion is always relative.
In the early 20th century, these ideas would lead Poincaré and then Einstein to formu-
late the Special Theory of Relativity. The theory is based on two simple postulates: 1.
The speed of light in vacuum is absolute, and 2. The laws of physics are same in all sys-
tems in relative constant motion. The consequence is that kinematics and dynamics are
not any more Galilean-invariant, but, as electromagnetic equations, Lorentz-invariant.
This leads to a dramatic reformulation of the concept of simultaneity, that now depends
on the inertial reference frame [6], and then to the introduction of space-time in physics.
Space-time
On September 21st 1908, Hermann Minkowski addressed the audience of the 80th
Assembly of German Natural Scientists and Physicians in Cologne with these rightly
famous opening words [7]:
The views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have sprung
from the soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their strength. They
are radical. Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade
away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an
independent reality.
What is this space-time of Minkowski?
Space-time is the ontological sum of all events of all things.
A thing is an individual endowed with physical properties. An event is a change in
the properties of a thing. An ontological sum is an aggregation of things or physical
properties, i.e. a physical entity or an emergent property. An ontological sum should not
be confused with a set, which is a mathematical construct and has only mathematical
(i.e. fictional) properties.
Everything that has happened, everything that happens, everything that will happen, is
just an element, a “point”, of space-time. Space-time is not a thing, it is just the relational
property of all things.
As happens with every physical property, we can represent space-time with some
mathematical structure, in order to describe it. We shall adopt the following mathemati-
cal structure for space-time:
Space-time can be represented by a C∞ differentiable, 4-dimensional, real manifold.
A real 4-D manifold is a set that can be covered completely by subsets whose elements
are in a one-to-one correspondence with subsets of ℜ4. Each element of the manifold
represents an event. We adopt 4 dimensions because it seems enough to give 4 real num-
bers to localize an event. We can always provide a set of 4 real numbers for every event,
and this can be done independently of the intrinsic geometry of the manifold. If there is
more than a single characterization of an event, we can always find a transformation law
between the different coordinate systems. This is a basic property of manifolds.
Now, if we want to calculate distances between two events, we need more structure on
the manifold: we need a geometric structure. We can get it introducing a metric tensor
gµν to determine distances. The infinitesimal separation between two events of space-
time is given by:
ds2 = gµνdxµ dxν . (1)
Space-time, then, is fully represented by an order pair (M,g), where M is the man-
ifold and g is the metric tensor. In General Relativity [8], the metric of space-time is
determined by the energy-momentum of the physical systems. These properties are rep-
resented by the so-called energy-momentum tensor. The metric itself then represents the
gravitational potential and its derivatives determine the equations of motion through the
affine connection of the manifold.
If Leibniz was right in his views of space and time, then it should be possible to build
space-time and its metrical properties from the properties of things. Space-time would
naturally emerge as a global relational property of the system of all things. If things have
quantum properties then space-time should reflect this at certain level. For discussions
and steps in this direction see Refs. [9] and [10].
Can we know the true geometry of the world?
In the late 19th century Henri Poincaré held that convention plays an important
role in physics. His view (and some later, more extreme versions of it) came to be
known as “conventionalism”. Poincaré believed that the geometry of physical space
is conventional. He considered examples in which either the geometry of the physical
fields or gradients of physical properties can be changed, either describing a space as
non-Euclidean measured by rigid rulers, or as a Euclidean space where the rulers are
expanded or shrunk by a variable heat distribution. Poincaré, however, thought that as
we were so used to Euclidean geometry, we would prefer to change the physical laws to
save Euclidean geometry rather than shift to a non-Euclidean physical geometry. This
conventionalist approach was applied also to the interpretation of Special Relativity, and
later to General Relativity (e.g. by Reichenbach and Grünbaum [11], [12]).
Reichenbach argued, in the vein of Poincaré, that an arbitrary geometry may be as-
cribed to space-time (holding constant the underlying topology) if the laws of physics
are correspondingly modified through the introduction of “universal forces”. Reichen-
bach’s thesis of metrical conventionalism is part of a program of epistemological re-
ductionism regarding space-time structures, where metrical properties of space-time are
deemed less fundamental than topological ones. The end point of Reichenbach’s epis-
temological analysis of the foundations of space-time theory is “the causal theory of
time”, a type of relational theory of time that assumes the validity of the causal principle
of action-by-contact.
In response to Poincaré and the Reichenbach challenge we can argue that theories
cannot be arbitrary complex in order to save the Euclidean geometry. Besides, the web
of our theories about the world must be coherent. To adopt complex ad-hoc fields to
compensate non-Euclideaness can have undesirable effects in other physical theories,
like quantum mechanics. In brief, we can say that all entities postulated by a theory are
just conjectural and can be adjusted when the consequences of the theory are confronted
with experiment. Our knowledge of the ontology of the world is not conventional but
conjectural.
A modest vindication of Paremenides: a block Universe
Parmenides of Elea, a town on the west coast of southern Italy, lived from the end
of the 6th century to the mid 5th century BC. He wrote a poem in the hexameter meter
entitled On What Is. This piece contains the first known example of a deductive system
applied to the physical reality. Parmenides was not content just with giving his view of
the world. He supported his view by logical deduction from what he considered self-
evident premises. He stated, as I have mentioned, that there is no change, no becoming,
no coming to be. Reality turns out to be unchanging, eternal, motionless, perfect, and
single. There is just one thing: the World. His monism is absolute. What we think is a
changing world is only the result of illusion and deception.
The premises of Parmenides’s argument can be written as:
• What is, is.
• What is not, is not.
Then, nothing can come to be from what is not, because ‘what is not’ is not something.
Change is impossible, since for Parmenides change is the occupation of empty space, but
there cannot be ‘empty space’. Reality must be an unchanging block.
The atomists Democritus and Leucippus denied the conclusion: there is no change.
Hence, they inferred, one of the premises is wrong. They decided to reject the second
one, and then stated that there are just two kind of things in the world: atoms and the
void. They invented the first theory of change.
Many centuries later, with the advent of field theories it became clear that change can
occur even in a full Universe: change does not require empty space. A perturbation in a
field that fills the whole Universe is a change. A change in degree or strength does not
require empty space.
The concept of change, as an ordered pair of states or an event, is central to the
manifold model of space-time. But once the geometry of the manifold is given by a
distribution of energy and momentum, its structure is fixed. The ‘points’ of the manifold
represent events, but there is no event or change affecting the space-time as a whole.
The four dimensional Universe, represented by the manifold model is unchanging,
eternal, motionless, single, just as the Parmenidean Universe. What we call irreversible
processes are asymmetries in the space-time. The objects that populate the Universe are
4-dimensional. They have ‘temporal parts’, as well as spatial parts. In this way, the child
I was, is just a part of a larger being, I, that is 4-dimensional. What we call ‘birth’ and
‘death’ are just temporal boundaries of such a being. Change appears only when we
consider 3-dimensional slices of 4-dimensional objects. In words of Max Tegmark:
Time is the fourth dimension. The passage of time is an illusion. We have
this illusion of a changing, three-dimensional world, even though nothing
changes in the four dimensional union of space and time of Einstein’s relativity
theory. If life were a movie, physical reality would be the entire DVD: Future
and past frames exist just as much as the present one.
Therefore, it seems fair to call this interpretation of space-time, usually known as
‘the block Universe’ [13], a Parmenidean view of the world. Parmenides is back with a
vengeance, in 4 dimensions.
When is ‘now’?
Events in space-time do not flow. They simply are. What is called the transient ‘now’
or ‘present’ is not itself an event in space-time. Events are ordered by the relations ‘ear-
lier than’ or ‘later than’, but no event is singled out as ‘present’, except by convention.
As noted by Adolf Günbaum [12], what is ‘now’ about a given event is that it is affect-
ing some conscious being who is aware of the event. The ‘present’ is not an intrinsic
property of a given event, much less a changing thing in the world, but a relation among
some number of events and a self-conscious individual. More specifically, we can define:
Present (psychological): class of all events that are physically related to given brain
event.
The present, consequently, like smell, sweetness, and other secondary qualities, is
introduced by the interaction of sentient individuals with their environment. Time does
not ‘flow’ in any physical sense. What changes is the state of our consciousness of the
events in our surroundings. Hermann Weyl (1885-1955) wrote:
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only the gaze of my
consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does a section
of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously
changes in time [14].
The awareness of present by a certain individual requires a series of time-like events
in the brain, and a series of such events implies some time interval. The integration of
all physically related events gives some temporal ‘thickness’ to what we perceive as the
‘present’. This is what William James called the ‘specious present’.
Specious present: length of the time-history of brain processes necessary to integrate
all events that are physically related to given brain event.
The specious present, then, being related to a brain process, can be different for
different individuals equipped with different brains.
The ‘becoming’ is not a property of the events of space-time, but a property of our
consciousness of such events. We call ‘becoming’ to the series of states of consciousness
associated with a series of physical events. Summing up, time does not go by. We do.
DETERMINISM AND PREDICTABILITY
Determinism is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the world. It is an ontological
assumption: the assumption that all events are given. It can be traced to Parmenides and
its “what is, is”. It is important to emphasize that determinism does not require causality
and does not imply predictability. Predictability is a property of our theories about the
world, not a property of the world itself.
The confusion between determinism and predictability can be traced to Pierre-Simon
Laplace and his Philosophical Essay on Probabilities:
We may regard the present state of the Universe as the effect of its past
and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would
know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of
which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit
these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of
the greatest bodies of the Universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be
present before its eyes.
According to Laplace, every state of the Universe is determined by a set of initial
conditions and the laws of physics. Since the laws are represented by differential equa-
tions and there are theorems for the existence and uniqueness of solutions, determinism
implies predictability. Theorems apply, however, only to mathematical objects, not to re-
ality. The world is not mathematical, just some of our representations of it are mathemat-
ical. The existence of solutions to some equations that represent physical laws does not
imply physical existence. Physical existence is independent of our conceptions. More-
over, even in Newtonian space-times there are Cauchy horizons. These are hypersurfaces
from where, even the in case of a complete specification of initial data, the solutions of
dynamical equations cannot predict all future events. This arises because of the absence
of an upper bound on the velocities of moving objects. For instance, consider the tra-
jectory of an object that is accelerated in such a way that its velocity becomes in effect
infinite in a finite time. This object will be disconnected from all later times (see Ref.
[15] for more examples).
General Relativity assumes the existence of all events represented by a manifold.
Hence, it is an deterministic theory. The Cauchy problem, however, cannot always be
solved in General Relativity. Cauchy horizons naturally appear in many solutions of
Einstein field equations (from wormholes to black hole interiors). Although the manifold
is fixed, we cannot always describe it from limited knowledge. A physical theory can be
ontologically deterministic but nonetheless epistemologically underdetermined.
The fact that there exist irreversible processes in the universe, implies that the space-
time manifold is intrinsically asymmetric. The laws that constrain the space-state of
physical things, and therefore their potential to change, however, are invariant under
time reversal. We turn now to this problem.
IRREVERSIBILITY AND SPACE-TIME
The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy of a closed system never
decreases. If entropy is denoted by S, this law reads:
dS
dt ≥ 0. (2)
In the 1870s, Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906) argued that the effect of randomly
moving gas molecules was to ensure that the entropy of a gas would increase, until
it reached its maximum possible value. This is his famous H-theorem. Boltzmann was
able to show that macroscopic distributions of great inhomogeneity (i.e. of high order
or low entropy) are formed from relatively few microstate arrangements of molecules,
and were, consequently, relatively improbable. Since physical systems do not tend to
go into states that are less probable than the states that they are in, it follows that any
system would evolve toward the macrostate that is consistent with the larger number of
microstates. The number of microstates and the entropy of the system are related by the
fundamental formula:
S = k lnW, (3)
where k = 10−23 JK−1 is Boltzmann’s constant and W is the volume of the phase-space
that corresponds to the macrostate of entropy S.
More than twenty years after the publication of Boltzmann’s fundamental papers on
kinetic theory, it was pointed out by Burbury [16],[17] that the source of asymmetry in
the H-theorem is the assumption that the motions of the gas molecules are independent
before they collide and not afterward, if entropy is going to increase. This essentially
means that the entropy increase is a consequence of the initial conditions imposed upon
the state of the system. Boltzmann’s response was:
There must then be in the Universe, which is in thermal equilibrium as a
whole and therefore dead, here and there, relatively small regions of the size of
our world, which during the relatively short time of eons deviate significantly
from thermal equilibrium. Among these worlds the state probability increases
as often as it decreases [18].
As noted by Price [19]: “The low-entropy condition of our region seems to be associ-
ated entirely with a low-energy condition in our past.”
The probability of the large fluctuations required for the formation of the Universe
we see, on the other hand, seems to be zero, as noted long ago by Eddington (1931):
“A Universe containing mathematical physicists at any assigned date will be in the state
of maximum disorganization which is not inconsistent with the existence of such crea-
tures.” Large fluctuations are rare (P∼ exp−∆S); extremely large fluctuations, basically
impossible . For the whole Universe, ∆S ∼ 10104 in units of k = 1. This yields P = 0.
In 1876, a former teacher of Boltzmann and later colleague at the University of
Vienna, J. Loschmidt, noted:
Obviously, in every arbitrary system the course of events must become
retrograde when the velocities of all its elements are reversed [21].
Putting the point in modern terminology, the laws of (Hamiltonian) mechanics are
such that for every solution one can construct another solution by reversing all velocities
and replacing t by −t. Since the Boltzmann’s function H[ f ] is invariant under velocity
reversal, it follows that if H[ f ] decreases for the first solution, it will increase for the
second. Accordingly, the reversibility objection is that the H-theorem cannot be a general
theorem for all mechanical evolutions of the gas. More generally, the problem goes far
beyond classical mechanics and encompasses our whole representation of the physical
world. This is because all formal representations of all fundamental laws of physics are
invariant under the operation of time reversal. Nonetheless, the evolution of all physical
processes in the Universe is irreversible.
If we accept, as mentioned, that the origin of the irreversibility is not in the laws but in
the initial conditions of the laws, two additional problems emerge: 1) What were exactly
these initial conditions?, and 2) How the initial conditions, of global nature, can enforce,
at any time and any place, the observed local irreversibility?
The first problem is, in turn, related to the following one, once the cosmological
setting is taken into account: in the past, the Universe was hotter and at some point
matter and radiation were in thermal equilibrium; how is this compatible with the fact
that entropy has ever been increasing according to the so-called Past Hypothesis, i.e.
entropy was at a minimum at some past time and has been increasing ever since?
The standard answer to this question invokes the expansion of the Universe: as
the Universe expanded, the maximum possible entropy increased with the size of the
Universe, but the actual entropy was left well behind the permitted maximum. The
Second Law of Thermodynamics and the source of irreversibility is the trend of the
entropy to reach the permitted maximum. According to this view, the Universe actually
began in a state of maximum entropy, but due to the expansion, it was still possible for
the entropy to continue growing.
The main problem with this line of thought is that it is not true that the Universe was
in a state of maximum disorder at some early time. In fact, although locally matter
and radiation might have been in thermal equilibrium, this situation occurred in a
regime where the global effects of gravity cannot be ignored [22]. Since gravity is an
attractive force, and the Universe was extremely smooth (i.e structureless) in early times,
as indicated, for instance, by the measurements of the cosmic microwave background
radiation, the gravitational field should have been quite far from equilibrium, with very
low global entropy [22]. It seems, then, that the early Universe was globally out of the
equilibrium, being the total entropy dominated by the entropy of the gravitational field.
If we denote by C2 a scalar formed out by contractions of the Weyl tensor, the initial
condition C2 ∼ 0 is required if entropy is still growing today 1.
How the Second Law is locally enforced by the initial conditions, which are of a
global nature? A possible answer is that there should be a coupling between gravitation
(of global nature) and electrodynamics (of local action).
1 This is because the Weyl tensor provides a measure of the inhomogeneity of the gravitational field.
The electromagnetic radiation field can be described in the terms of the 4-potential
Aµ , which in the Lorentz gauge satisfies:
∂ ν ∂ν Aµ(~r, t) = 4pi jµ(~r, t), (4)
with c = 1 and jµ the 4-current. The solution Aµ is a functional of the sources jµ . The
retarded and advanced solutions are:
Aµret(~r, t) =
∫
Vret
jµ
(
~r, t−
∣∣∣~r−~r′
∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r−~r′∣∣∣ d
3~r′+
∫
∂Vret
jµ
(
~r, t−
∣∣∣~r−~r′
∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r−~r′∣∣∣ d
3~r′, (5)
Aµadv(~r, t) =
∫
Vadv
jµ
(
~r, t +
∣∣∣~r−~r′
∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r−~r′
∣∣∣ d
3~r′+
∫
∂Vadv
jµ
(
~r, t +
∣∣∣~r−~r′
∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r−~r′
∣∣∣ d
3~r′. (6)
The two functionals of jµ(~r, t) are related to one another by a time reversal transfor-
mation. The solution (5) is contributed by sources in the past of the space-time point
p(~r, t) and the solution (6) by sources in the future of that point. The integrals in the
second term on the right side are the surface integrals that give the contributions from
i) sources outside of V and ii) source-free radiation. If V is the causal past and future,
the surface integrals do not contribute. At this point it is convenient to introduce formal
definitions of causal curves, past and future [23].
Definition. A causal curve in a space-time (M, gµν) is a curve that is non space-like,
that is, piecewise either time-like or null (light-like).
Definition. If (M, gµν) is a time-orientable space-time, then ∀p∈M, the causal future
of p, denoted J+(p), is defined by:
J+(p)≡ {q ∈ M|∃ a f uture−directed causal curve f rom p to q} . (7)
Similarly,
Definition. If (M, gµν) is a time-orientable space-time, then ∀p ∈ M, the causal past
of p, denoted J−(p), is defined by:
J−(p)≡ {q ∈ M|∃ a past−directed causal curve f rom p to q} . (8)
We see, then, that if Vadv = J+(p) and Vret = J−(p) there are no contributions from
outside of the causal past and future, and the surface integrals yield zero.
The linear combinations of electromagnetic solutions are also solutions, since the
equations are linear and the Principle of Superposition holds. It is usual to consider only
the retarded potential as physically meaningful in order to estimate the electromagnetic
field at p(~r, t): Fµνret = ∂ µAνret−∂ ν Aµret. However, there seems to be no compelling reason
for such a choice. We can adopt, for instance (in what follows we use a simplified
notation),
Aµ(~r, t) =
1
2
(∫
J+
adv +
∫
J−
ret
)
dV. (9)
If the space-time is curved (R 6= 0), the null cones that determine the local causal
structure will not be symmetric around the point p (~r, t). In particular, the presence of
cosmological particle horizons can make the contributions very different from both in-
tegrals. Particle horizons occur whenever a particular system never gets to be influenced
by the whole space-time.
Definition. For a causal curve γ the associated future (past) particle horizon is defined
as the boundary of the region from which the causal curves can reach some point on γ .
Finding the particle horizon (if one exists at all) requires a knowledge of the global
space-time geometry. Particle horizons occur in systems undergoing lasting acceleration.
The radius of the past particle horizon is [24]:
Rpast = a(t)
∫ t
t ′=0
c
a(t ′)
dt ′, (10)
where a(t) is the time-dependent scale factor of the Universe. The radius of the future
particle horizon (some times called event horizon) is:
Rfuture = a(t0)
∫
∞
t ′0
c
a(t ′)
dt ′. (11)
If the Universe is accelerating, as seems to be suggested by recent observations [25],
then J+(p) and J−(p) are not symmetric and the result of integrals (5) and (6) is
different. We can then introduce a vector field Lµ given by:
Lµ =
[∫
J−
ret−
∫
J+
adv
]
dV 6= 0. (12)
If gµν LµT ν 6= 0, with T ν = (1,0,0,0) there is a preferred direction for the Poynting
flux in space-time. The Poynting flux is given by:
~S = 4pi
c
~E×~B = (T 01EM,T
02
EM,T
03
EM), (13)
where ~E and ~B are the electric and magnetic fields and T µνEM is the electromagnetic
energy-momentum tensor.
In a black hole interior the direction of the Poynting flux is toward the singularity. In
an expanding, accelerating Universe, it is in the global future direction. We see, then,
that a time-like vector field, in a general space-time (M,gµν), can be anisotropic. There
is a global to local relation given by the Poynting flux as determined by the curvature
of space-time that indicates the direction along which events occur. Physical processes,
inside a black hole, have a different orientation from outside, and the causal structure
of the world is determined by the dynamics of space-time and the initial conditions.
Macroscopic irreversibility2 and time anisotropy emerge from fundamental reversible
laws.
There is an important corollary to these conclusions. Local observations about the
direction of events can provide information about global features of space-time and the
existence of horizons and singularities.
RELATIVITY AND NON-LOCALITY
The compatibility of Relativity theory and quantum mechanics is an essential issue in
the foundations of physical science. The experimental refutation of Bell’s inequalities3 in
the 1980s indicated that quantum mechanics is not a local theory since action-at-distance
effects are present. This seems to contradict one of the basic postulates of Special (and
General) Relativity: the impossibility for any physical system to surpass the speed of
light. In this section we will take a closer look at this problem.
The problem: quantum entanglement
Quantum mechanics embraces action at a distance with a property called entangle-
ment, in which two particles behave synchronously with no intermediary; it is a non-
local property. For instance, calcium vapor exposed to lasers fluoresces. Excited atoms
cascade down to their ground states and they give off light. Each atom emits a pair of
photons which travel off in opposite directions. The polarization of these photons shows
no preferred direction. The pairs, however, display a striking correlation: each member
of the pair always acts as if it has the same polarization as its partner. This quantum
connection has different properties:
• The quantum connection is unattenuated by distance.
• The quantum connection is discriminating: only particles which have interacted in
the past are affected by it. No classical force exhibits this behavior.
• The quantum connection is faster than light, and likely instantaneous. This seems
to be incompatible with relativistic space-time structure.
Everybody knows that Relativity forbids something. Not everyone agrees, however,
about what is forbidden. There are different possibilities discussed in the literature, as
2 Notice that the electromagnetic flux is related with the macroscopic concept of temperature through the
Stefan-Boltzmann law: L=AσSBT 4, where σSB = 5.670400×10−8J s−1m−2K−4 is the Stefan-Boltzmann
constant.
3 Bell’s theorem states that no physical theory which is realistic and also local in a specified sense can
agree with all of the statistical implications of Quantum Mechanics. Here the word ‘realistic’ actually
means deterministic in a Laplacian sense (see above). Many different versions and cases, with family
resemblances, were inspired by Bell’s 1964 paper [27] and are subsumed under the italicized statement,
“Bell’s Theorem” being the collective name for the entire family.
reviewed by Tim Maudlin [26]:
1. Relativity forbids matter to be transported faster than light.
2. Relativity forbids signals to be sent faster than light.
3. Relativity forbids information to be transmitted faster than light.
4. Relativity forbids causal processes to propagate faster than light.
Actually, Relativity just states that subluminal systems cannot become superlumi-
nal and viceversa. Hypothetical superluminal tachyons do not violate Relativity’s laws.
Tachyon theory shows that Relativity is not restricted to systems with subluminal speed
in order to be consistent. On other hand, violation of Bell’s inequalities does not require
superluminal matter transport or signaling. Much less of information. Information is a
property of languages, not of physical systems. Contrary to what Tim Maudlin states
[26], superluminal transmission of information is not required by quantum entangle-
ment. Information has not, and cannot, have any effect upon physical systems.
Contrary to all these views, I sustain that violation of Bell’s inequalities is possible if
causation can be non-local. In what follows I provide a non-local definition of causation
(see Ref. [28] for more details).
Causality revisited
Causation is a form of event generation [29]. To present an explicit definition of
causation requires introducing some ontological concepts to formally characterize what
is understood by ‘event’.
The concept of individual is the basic primitive concept of any ontological theory4.
Individuals associate themselves with other individuals to yield new individuals. It
follows that they satisfy a calculus, and that they are rigorously characterized only
through the laws of such a calculus. These laws are set with the aim of reproducing
the way real things associate. Specifically, it is postulated that every individual is an
element of a set s in such a way that the structure S = 〈s,◦,〉 is a commutative monoid
of idempotents. This is a simple additive semi-group with neutral element.
In the structure S, s is the set of all individuals, the element ∈ s is a fiction called the
null individual, and the binary operation ◦ is the association of individuals. Although S
is a mathematical entity, the elements of s are not, with the only exception of , which is
a fiction introduced to form a calculus. The association of any element of s with  yields
the same element. The following definitions characterize the composition of individuals.
1. x ∈ s is composed ⇔ (∃y,z)s (x = y◦ z)
2. x ∈ s is simple ⇔∼ (∃y,z)s (x = y◦ z)
3. x ⊂ y ⇔ x◦ y = y (x is part of y ⇔ x◦ y = y)
4. Comp(x)≡ {y ∈ s | y ⊂ x} is the composition of x.
4 I follow Bunge [30] on the basics of the ontological views presented here.
Real things are distinguished from abstract individuals because they have a number of
properties in addition to their capability of association. These properties can be intrinsic
(Pi) or relational (Pr). The intrinsic properties are inherent and they are represented by
predicates or unary applications, whereas relational properties depend upon more than a
single thing and are represented by n-ary predicates, with n ≥ 1. Examples of intrinsic
properties are electric charge and rest mass, whereas velocity of macroscopic bodies and
volume are relational properties5.
An individual with its properties make up a thing X :
X =< x,P(x)>
Here P(x) is the collection of properties of the individual x. A material thing is an
individual with concrete properties, i.e. properties that can change (see below) in some
respect.
The state of a thing X is a set of functions S(X) from a domain of reference M (a set
that can be enumerable or nondenumerable6) to the set of properties PX . Every function
in S(X) represents a property in PX . The set of the physically accessible states of a thing
X is the lawful state space of X : SL(X). The state of a thing is represented by a point
in SL(X). A change of a thing is an ordered pair of states. Only changing things can be
material. Abstract things cannot change since they have only one state (their properties
are fixed by definition).
A legal statement is a restriction upon the state functions of a given class of things.
A natural law is a property of a class of material things represented by an empirically
corroborated legal statement.
The ontological history h(X) of a thing X is a subset of SL(X) defined by
h(X) = {〈t,F(t)〉|t ∈ M}
where t is an element of some auxiliary set M, and F are the functions that represent the
properties of X .
If a thing is affected by other things we can introduce the following definition:
h(Y/X): “history of the thing Y in presence of the thing X”.
Let h(X) and h(Y ) be the histories of the things X and Y , respectively.
Then
h(Y/X) = {〈t,H(t)〉| t ∈ M},
where H 6= F is the total state function of Y as affected by the existence of X , and F is
the total state function of X in the absence of Y . The history of Y in presence of X is
different from the history of Y without X .
5 Velocity is an intrinsic property only in the case of photons and other bosons that move at the speed of
light in any reference system.
6 In most physically interesting cases M is a space-time continuum.
We can now introduce the notion of action:
X ⊲Y : “X acts on Y ”
X ⊲Y de f= h(Y/X) 6= h(Y )
An event is a change of a thing X , i.e. an ordered pair of states:
(s1,s2) ∈ EL(X) = SL(X)×SL(X)
The space EL(X) is called the event space of X .
Causality is a relation between events, i.e. a relation between changes of states of
concrete things. It is not a relation between things. Only the related concept of ‘action’
is a relation between things. Specifically,
C(x): “an event in a thing x is caused by some unspecified event exxi”.
C(x)
de f
= (∃exxi)
[
exxi ∈ EL(x)
]
⇔ xi ⊲ x.
C(x,y): “an event in a thing x is caused by an event in a thing y”.
C(x,y) de f= (∃exy)
[
exy ∈ EL(x)
]
⇔ y⊲ x.
In the above definitions7, the notation exy indicates in the superscript the thing x to
whose event space belongs the event e, whereas the subscript denotes the thing that acted
triggering the event. The implicit arguments of both C and C are events, not things. For
simplicity in the notation we refer to the things that undergo the events. We shall also
use hereafter lower case letters for variables that take values upon a domain of things.
Causation is a form of event generation. The crucial point is that a given event in the
lawful event space EL(x) is caused by an action of a thing y iff the event happens only
conditionally to the action, i.e., it would not be the case of exy without an action of y
upon x. Time does not appear in this definition, allowing causal relations in space-time
without a global time orientability or even instantaneous and non-local causation.
If causation is non-local under some circumstances, e.g. when a quantum system
is prepared in a specific state of polarization or spin, quantum entanglement poses no
problem to realism and determinism. The quantum theory describes an aspect of a reality
that is ontologically determined and with non-local relations. Under any circumstances
the postulates of Special Relativity are violated, since no physical system ever crosses
the barrier of the speed of light.
7 These definitions are part of joint work with Daniela Pérez.
FURTHER ISSUES
In this article it was only possible to make a quick survey of some issues in the founda-
tions of space-time theories. Many more can be mentioned. For instance,
• What is the ontological nature of singularities in physical theories? Singularities
appear in space-time theories but they do not belong to the reference domain of
the theories, since the manifold model of space-time breaks if it does not remain
regular. What is the physics hidden by the singularities?
• Paradoxes generated by close timelike curves (CTCs). These paradoxes (e.g. see
Ref. [31]) seem to suggest the existence of consistency constraints at an ontological
level.
• Zeno-like paradoxes. These paradoxes are related to the notions of continuum and
metric properties of sets.
• Identity. How is possible to say that my dog is the same dog that my daughter
bought as a puppy two years ago? I do not remember anything about myself when I
was 1 year old. In what sense I am the same person? What if I lose all my memories?
Shall I still be the same person? What is a person? What is identity through time?
• Constitution: When change of constitution changes identity?
• Spacetime and God. Is the concept of God compatible with the manifold model
of space-time? If the world is determined, God knows all events. How can He
change something then? What happens with His omnipotence if He cannot change
anything?
• The nature of explanation. How complete are our explanations of the events? How
much can we know?
• Representation and reality. Can we know the true ontology of the world? Can an
ontology be true?
• Ethics: How we should live in a world like this?
Just a few questions, of many more that can be posed. I dare suggest, nonetheless, that
none is as much important for us as the latter. For the Hellenistic Greeks, physics was a
road to a better ethics. For most of us, regrettably, it is not even a road. It is just a job.
CONCLUSIONS
We have looked at some issues in the foundations of space-time theories. The main
conclusions can be clearly stated. There seem to be global-to-local connections that
generate what we call ‘irreversibility’, which is essentially asymmetry in space-time.
Causation seems to be a non-local event generation process for things that form a system
(i.e., connected things). There is no ‘becoming’. The world is just the totality of all events
of all things. Philosophical inquiry on the foundations of scientific theories is essential
to determine the consistency, scope, reference, and assumptions of our representations
of the physical world. Better a conjectural, explicit philosophy, that can be criticized,
than a bunch of hidden prejudices that can only be defended.
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